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RELEARNING FOUNDING LESSONS:
THE REMOVAL POWER AND
JOINT ACCOUNTABILITY
Martin S. Flahertyt

INTRODUCTION

Recent history has not been kind to those who have championed the President's exclusive power to remove government officials who implement the law. In 1936, Solicitor General Stanley
Reed confidently argued that President Roosevelt could properly
fire Federal Trade Commission member William E. Humphrey for
reasons other than "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office,"' the grounds to which Congress had limited the President's
removal authority.2 Reed lost.3 Fifty years later, Solicitor General
Charles Fried (perhaps less confidently) argued that President Reagan could fire Independent Counsel Alexia Morrison for reasons
other than "good cause, physical disability [and] mental incapacity,"4 the grounds to which Congress had restricted the President's
removal authority in that instance.5 Fried also lost.6 Combined,
t Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. B.A. 1981, Princeton; M.A. 1982,
M.Phil. 1987, Yale; J.D. 1988, Columbia. My thanks for comments on earlier drafts to
Jim Fleming, Abner Greene, and Bill Treanor. Thanks as well to Minna Jung and
Kathleen McGann for invaluable research assistance. Finally, I am grateful to all the participants in this Symposium, particularly my co-panelists Steven Calabresi, Jonathan Entin,
Theodore Lowi, and Christopher Yoo.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1995).
2. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 612-17 (1935) (argument
of Solicitor General Reed). So confident was Reed that the case could not be lost that,
following tradition, he chose it as the first case he would argue in his new post. For a
lively account, see WILL!AM E. LEUCHTENBURG, Tm SuPREME COURT REBORN 52-81
(1995).
3. See 295 U.S. at 602.
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 et seq. (1982).
5. For an account discussing the White House's constitutional position and strategy,
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these and other defeats' stand for the proposition that certain congressional limitations on Executive removal authority do not necessarily "impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional
duty" 8 -at least for now.
Today's champions of presidential removal authority may be
down, but they are far from out. Justice Scalia, of course, has
carved out a central place as the judiciary's most prolific and passionate opponent of congressional meddling in the President's powers in general, and the ability to discharge subordinates in particular.9 If there is any one scholar who can lay claim to being the
Justice's academic counterpart, it is Professor Steven Calabresi.' °
Professor Calabresi makes a strong, unified case for a "strong
and unitary Executive." "[T he United States Constitution," the
argument goes, "allocates the power of law execution and administration to the President alone."" It follows that this allocation of
executive power entails the exclusive authority "to remove inferior
executive officers, either by firing them altogether, or by removing
permanently their ability to exercise implicitly delegated executive
power."' 2 These Constitutional commands, in turn, display great
normative wisdom in a number of ways. Here Calabresi follows
other "unitarian" champions in citing popular accountability as a
"key consideration."' 3 On this view, a unitary executive that controls removal authority promotes such accountability by making it
easer for the people "to detect4 policy errors and to punish those
who are responsible for them."'

see CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRST-

HAND ACCOUNT 133-41 (1991).
6. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding good-cause
removal limitation).
8. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
9. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697
(Scalia, J.,dissenting); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.
L. REV. 849 (1989).
10. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for
the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153

(1992).
11. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 10, at 549.
12. Id. at 596.
13. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 42.
14. Id. at 42.
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Like Justice Scalia, Calabresi has tried to show that time
really should be on the side of the unitarians. Previously he and
Saikrishna Prakash sought to demonstrate that the original understanding of the Constitution contemplated exclusive presidential
removal authority. If so, most originalist theories of interpretation
would mandate the same result today. As he and Christopher Yoo
graciously acknowledge, 5 I recently suggested that the original
understanding was not so. 6
Undaunted, Calabresi and Yoo now bring the historical account forward beyond the Founding, asserting that the post-ratification history indicates "no systematic, unbroken, long-standing practice . . . of presidential acquiescence to congressionally-imposed
limitations on the President's sole'power to execute the laws and
remove subordinate officials."' 7 "On the contrary," they continue,
"the historical record shows that Presidents almost always object or
fight when [at least from their point of view] Congress trespasses
on their constitutional power to execute the laws free from legislative control."' 8 This part of the record in the first instance matters
less for originalist purposes than as a discrete source of constitutional understanding. Drawing upon Justice Frankfurter, Calabresi
and Yoo contend that consistent post-ratification practice provides a
"gloss on [constitutional] text" that may illustrate how various
branches view the scope of their own power and which may resolve separation of powers questions more generally. 9 Having
articulated this "Burkean" theory of constitutional meaning, the
authors conclude that the post-ratification history that they commence in these pages demonstrates that no reasonable "common
law constitutionalist could conclude that history and practice resolves the unitary executive debate in Congress's favor."2 ° Taken
together, the originalist and Burkean points of view come down to
a simple and powerful proposition: "They the Presidents" have
done nothing to cede the authority to remove executive officers
originally granted by "We the People."

15. Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1451, 1454-55 (1997).
16. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE LJ. 1725 (1996).
17. Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 15, at 1472.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1470. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure
Case) 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
20. Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 15, at 1472.
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Arguments based upon history, however, are---or should
be--only as convincing as the history they employ. Here that history appears nothing if not rigorous and intuitive. That said, no
account this sweeping and ambitious can count as conclusive without more work, especially by scholars with the time and expertise
to subject the authors' various claims to adequate historical scrutiny. Yet even if the current account is taken as dispositive, the
historical case settles constitutional matters only so far, a point
Calabresi and Yoo concede. For starters, consistent presidential
claims of exclusive removal authority by themselves say nothing
about whether Congress or the courts acquiesced to these claims.
As Calabresi and Yoo rightly point out, "[W]e do not deem it
necessary for our purposes to prove that there is a 208-year-old
three-branch consensus about these matters."'" More importantly,
history since the Founding cannot resolve the issue if the history of
the Founding indicates that there was no exclusive executive removal power for presidents to cede in the first place.
This essay argues that there was not. A thorough review of
the original understanding indicates no reason to expect consensus
on the matter. Rather, where widespread commitments do emerge,
they tend to cut the other way. This is particularly-and perhaps
counterintuitively-true with regard to accountability, traditionally a
unitarian strong suit. Part I attempts to clear up certain misunderstandings at the outset to show precisely where my disagreements
with Professor Calabresi do and do not lie. The underbrush cleared,
Part H lays the groundwork for my own position by suggesting
what should count as "good history" in the first place. Mindful of
the resulting standards, Part III critiques Calabresi and Yoo's historical assertions, then considers their theoretical commitments to
make clear how important the Founding remains for their current
arguments about presidential non-acquiescence. Part IV therefore
turns to the Founding. It first argues that, however much the
Founders discussed accountability in modem unitarian terms, they
developed and displayed a more fundamental commitment to a
theory of "joint accountability," which treated the popular claims of
any single government department as suspect and multiple popular
sources of government oversight as preferred. This Part also applies
this concept through a model of translation to the Supreme Court's
removal jurisprudence to suggest that Reed and Fried rightly lost.

21. Id. at 1457.
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This essay concludes that at-will executive removal may or may
not be a timely innovation, but that a review of times past indicates that its implementation as a settled constitutional doctrine
would be an innovation nonetheless.
I. UNTANGLING A PRELIMINARY KNOT

As Calabresi and Yoo rightly indicate, I have argued that 200
years of constitutional practice since the Founding undermine the
unitarian claim that the President alone can properly exercise executive removal authority.' This argument was just that-a contention about modem constitutional doctrine, though one that drew
upon various historical understandings to get there. My principal
claim went, and goes, something like this: first, that the Founding
generation believed that separation of powers stood for certain
broad, functional goals, such as balance among the branches; second, that 200 years of practice has resulted in great institutional
change, such as a significant shift in power away from Congress
and to the President; and thus, third, that judicial intervention to
safeguard presidential power undercuts such Founding commitments
as balance in light of changed circumstances.' Calabresi and Yoo,
however, for some reason confuse this argument, which relies on
post-Founding history, with my historical account of that history.
Their article does this in a number of ways. It expressly
chides me for my "misassessment of the unitary executive's history.",24 It castigates me for failing to live up to my own professed

standards of historical scholarship.' It also appears to assume that
the history it offers directly challenges my own historical account
of the 200 years in question.' All of this curiously proceeds without any mention of my specific historical assertions about the two
centuries in question other than, it seems, an attribution to me of
other scholars' positions that the executive branch never consistent-

22. See id.at 1456.

23. See Flaherty, supra note 16, at 1810-36.
24. Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 15, at 1460 n.25.

25. See id.at 1460. On this point Calabresi and Yoo fairly note that many of my
criticisms of Calabresi and Prakash's historical method were indeed and perhaps unfortunately sharp. What they do not do is what my own article did in making those criticisms:
attempt to carefully lay out the historical assertions and supporting material to be
critiqued, then seek to demonstrate how those specific propositions rested on insufficient
command of the relevant historical scholarship and of primary sources.
26. See id.
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ly opposed independent agencies 27 -an assertion that appears nowhere in my work directly or indirectly.
While I am as keen as the next fellow to reap extra citations
as a straw person,28 the truth is that Calabresi, Yoo, and I do not
necessarily disagree on the executive's post-ratification history.
Given what my own assertions actually were, there may even be a
basis for eventual accord. My principal-and only extended-assertion about constitutional development since the Founding
was straightforward, noncontroversial, and almost trivially evident.
For various reasons, I argued, the presidency has evolved into a far
more formidable institution than it was envisioned to be at the
Founding. 9 Presidents, as noted, have successfully garnered increased power both in absolute terms and with respect to Congress." They have also facilitated their growth in power with
greater claims to a popular democratic base.3 Before making this
point, my article quotes the eminent historian Forrest McDonald for
the proposition that 200 years of disagreement between Presidents
and Congresses suggests a lack of consensus on the unitarian vision of the executive. 2 It is not clear that Calabresi and Yoo
would dispute these points. To the contrary, their narrative of vigorous Chief Magistrates sits comfortably with the notion that the
presidency has increased its authority over time. The same narrative
likewise comports with the thesis of consistent interbranch conflict
by demonstrating how one of the political branches has consistently
tussled with the other over such matters as removal.
Where we do disagree is on the constitutional conclusions that
the post-Founding historical practice suggests. Here the principal

27. See id. at 1456 & n.20.
28. See RicHARD A. POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUrATION (1990) (arguing that
legal reputation correlates with frequent citation by others of one's work).
29. See generally, Flaherty, supra note 16, at 1816-26.
30. See id. at 1816-21, 1821-24; see also supra text accompanying note 23.
31. See Flaherty, supra note 16, at 1821-24.
32. See id. at 1816 (quoting FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN
INTELLECTUAL ISTORY 180 n. 35 (1994)). Two things are problematic about Calabresi
and Yoo's characterization of this argument. First, and without really making clear what it
contended, their focus on this point, while ignoring my main assertions, implies that it
was a more important component of my article than it actually was. Second, they bolster
this impression by making unclear to what extent the exact articulation about 200 years of
interbranch conflict came from me or Forrest McDonald. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note
15, at 1456 & n.20. In truth, the entire quotation comes from McDonald precisely because I did not desire to toss around too many bold statements about the topic on my
own. That said, I have seen nothing to contradict McDonald's thesis. To the contrary,
Calabresi and Yoo's present effort is entirely consistent with it.
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conclusion that Calabresi and Yoo draws holds that "the historical
practice over the last 208 years tends to confirm rather than disprove the textual, structural, originalist, and normative arguments in
favor of a presidential power to control execution of laws."33
More specifically, they contend that since successive Presidents
have defended sole executive authority to execute the laws in historical terms, Presidents have not ceded the power otherwise legitimately claimed for constitutional purposes. Just what the presidency
thereby retains therefore depends on the predicate assumptions
concerning legitimate executive authority. As Calabresi and Yoo
note, those assumptions could follow the lead of Burke and Frankfurter and emphasize constitutional practice as it has actually
evolved. On this view, presidential resistance at the very least robs
those who oppose the unitary executive of the argument that the
President has acquiesced to a congressional power grab.34 Interestingly, Calabresi and Yoo do not themselves embrace this approach." Rather, their assumptions about the baseline of presidential power rest on ostensibly stronger sources, including original
understanding. On this view, when individual Presidents defend
their power to execute the law, they are really defending the original allocation of power set forth when the Constitution was framed
and ratified.
I start with a radically different predicate, and thus draw upon
practice since the Founding to draw radically different conclusions.
Broadly speaking, the principal approach in my work concentrates
on fidelity to original understanding through translation and synthesis. Under this theory, Calabresi and Yoo's post-Founding account
would confirm the original understanding on the assumption that
this understanding commanded a unitary executive. Assuming,
however, that the Founding understandings do not support a unitary
executive, Calabresi and Yoo's description of practice would at
best be irrelevant, demonstrating merely that Presidents fought for
authority never exclusively granted to them in the first place.
Worse, the Founding may even stand for certain predicate rules
under which presidential assertions of exclusive authority are best
viewed with suspicion. Should, as previously suggested, the Founding mandate balance among the three branches, a post-Founding

33. Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 15, at 1460.
34. See id. at 1457.
35. See id.
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shift in power to the President would logically weigh against the
Supreme Court stepping in on behalf of the increasingly powerful
Chief Executive.
Where Calabresi contends that the Founding is best understood
as supporting a formalist, unitary executive,36 I have argued that
this position simply has no basis in even the most minimally adequate historical account. Worse still, I have further sought to
demonstrate that where the Founding does yield something like
widespread agreement, the constitutional values that result suggest
that there is even less reason to support a unitary executive in
1997 than in 1787 when those values are translated into the
changed circumstances that 200 years of practice have wrought.38
It is on this originalist predicate-not the 208 years of practice-where Calabresi and Yoo on one hand, and I on the other,
part company. In short, the constitutional relevance of Calabresi
and Yoo's current project to a significant extent turns on first
adhering to original understanding, an approach that Calabresi has
elsewhere extolled and does not here reject.
But what of Burkean custom? That is, what of two centuries
of practice not as changed circumstances to apply Founding values,
but as a discrete source of constitutional authority in its own right?
Recall that Calabresi and Yoo seek to refute my position on just
this ground, claiming that I argue 200 years of constitutional custom undermines the unitary executive directly. Yet in truth, I have
almost nothing to say about practice in terms either Burkean or
Frankfurterian. 39 Following Forrest McDonald, I have nonetheless
suggested in passing that 200 years of inconclusive turf battles
between the President and Congress do not appear to furnish a
promising source of binding rules to resolve matters, such as removal, over which battles still rage.
Moreover, my historical assertion about 200 years of interbranch infighting fits comfortably with an account that portrays
Presidents as consistently guarding their authority if only because
consistent presidential defense almost necessarily suggests consistent

36. Calabresi and Prakrash argued this point at length. See Calabresi & Prakrash, supra
note 10. Calabresi and Yoo now take this position as a given. See Calabresi & Yoo,
supra note 15, at 1455-57, 1472, 1475.
37. See Flaherty, supra note 16. at 155-1810.
38. See id. at 1810-36.
39. Contrary to the impression conveyed by Calabresi and Yoo, see Calabresi & Yoo,
supra note 15, at 1460 & n.25, my reliance on this interpretive approach commanded two
sentences in a 112-page article. See Flaherty, supra note 16, at 1816.
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congressional opposition. Such consistent defense, if demonstrated,
would indeed show that Presidents have not acquiesced to congressional assertions of power and thus not count against the unitary
executive. How much it would settle beyond that is another matter.
Calabresi and Yoo nowhere claim that it would. To the contrary,
they deem it important to assert that presidential action does not
merely furnish Burkean custom, but that this custom confirms the
original grant of power to the President at the Founding. For all of
us, in short, the 208 years of custom-on which we largely
agree-is significant, but the Founding-about which we almost
completely differ-remains the key.
II. THE ILLUSION OF MASTERY
As should be clear, both originalist and Burkean approaches
share a heavy reliance on the past as a source of constitutional
meaning. This common reliance in turn stems from a common
theoretical desire to augment normative legal arguments with a
source of authority external to the law. To this extent, it follows
that this mutual reliance on the past subjects both approaches not
just to the standards of law, but to history as well.
Originalism classically focuses on the "legislative history"
leading up to the enactment of a given constitutional text or doctrine-here, separation of powers.' This evidence matters for a
range of reasons. Most strongly, it all but dictates a result on the
democratic positivist ground that Constitutional rules owe their
authority to the considered choice of the American people acting in
their sovereign capacity through the ratification process.4 Less
forcefully, the understanding of the Founders in particular yields
the persuasive authority of an exceptionally talented group of men
with practical experience that remains unmatched.42 A surprising
array of modem constitutional thinkers accept some form of
originalism, including several who blanche at the term.43 For the

40. Originalist analysis does at times go beyond the Founding to look at early practice,
decisions of the First Congress in particular. Here the idea is that original understanding
prior to ratification can be inferred from the early implementation of provisions when
there is little reason to believe that the slightly later understandings evident diverge in any
significant way from the original one.
41. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819).
42. William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 856-59 (1995).
43. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519

1572

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1563

removal debate as for other areas of constitutional law, this
originalist turn makes the historical stakes ever higher. Earlier this
century Chief Justice Taft invoked originalist history to claim the
Founding for the unitarian view.' Today his heirs continue seeking to entrench that title.
Another historical tack--especially prominent in separation of
powers analysis-is custom, practice, tradition. Here the premium
is on evolving practice after ratification of a given rule. Here, too,
the past matters on a number of counts. Some constitutional authorities, such as Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, argue that custom matters as a gloss on Constitutional text.' Others, like Chief
Justice Rehnquist, view it as a direct source of constitutional law
in its own right.' Still others, most provocatively Professor Larry
Kramer, view bodies developing tradition as paramount even to
other sources, arguing that well-settled practices should trump even
the original understanding and text themselves.47
However different, each of these justifications for relying on
history share a critical element. Common to them all is some notion that history theoretically provides an external constraint on
constitutional discourse, furnishing a source of authority or guidance outside technical canons of construction or "naked" individual
preference. In this regard, Laura Kalman rightly observes that
originalism retains its appeal thanks in large part to its promise of
constraining constitutional choice.' The same can be said of constitutional custom as well.
Reliance on an external body of knowledge means, or should
mean, reliance on the conventions that define that body of knowledge. Sociological arguments seem more credible when they follow
the canons developed by sociologists; economic points, when they
pass muster among economists; and historical assertions when they

(1997); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and
Nerve, 65 FORDHAm L. REv. 1249 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997).
44. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 94 (1926). 45. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
46. See Dame & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 649 (1982).
47. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 157 (1990) (suggesting

that respect for precedent was inherent in the original understanding of federal "judicial
power") with Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994)
(emphasizing the importance of constitutional practice).
48. See LAuRA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 132-39, 236
(1996).
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comport with standards recognized by historians. At least for history, these corollaries follow for reasons that are at once old-fashioned and post-modem. Those traditionalists seeking to enhance
their legal points with an appeal to what "actually happened" must
abide by the standards historians have developed since those precepts define what is credible. More avant-garde thinkers, who deny
an objective reality and merely desire to enhance their arguments
with insights from other disciplines, must likewise recognize
historians' standards because those standards determine what counts
as an insight from that discipline.49 Exhorting lawyers to follow
historians' standards when making historical points has proven
surprisingly
controversial,
though-it
should be pointed
out-controversial only among lawyers." To their credit, however,
neither Calabresi nor Yoo appear to be among the interdisciplinary
nihilists.
That said, few legal academics-and probably no lawyer or
judge---ordinarily enjoy the time, training, or resources to come
close to making the historical grade. Then again, fewer still probably see the problem. As Professor John Hart Ely noted, "Now I
know we lawyers are a cocky lot: the fact that our profession
brings us into contact with many disciplines often generates the
delusion that we have mastered them all."'" Consider, then, the
following anomaly. Typically, a graduate student of history will
spend years taking courses to acquire both research skills and a
general background, mastering the secondary literature in a chosen
specialty, and then pouring over archival and other primary source
materials-all for a topic that can be as narrow as a single specific
event. By contrast, a lawyer, judge, even a law professor will, at
most, commonly spend a few weeks constructing a historical account, and then usually proceed directly to certain readily available
sources (or their indices) with little or no effort to set the evidence
in any context. One usually writes for an audience of three or four
within an academic department. The other, if lucky, may find his
or her assertions used to shape the supreme law of the land.

49. I respond to some of these critiques at greater length in Martin S. Flaherty, The
Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
50. See Mark Tushnet, InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law,
71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 909 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 302 (1995).
51.

(1980).

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRuST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 56
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Fortunately, the legal community need not be condemned to
relying on accounts that might embarrass undergraduates. Lawyers
may not be able either to acquire an adequate general background
nor pour over hundreds of pamphlets, letters, cases, and papers.52
But historians, who do all this and more, in effect can do so on
their behalf. Elsewhere I have termed-and repeatedly extolled-greater reliance on historians as "pragmatic fidelity" to the
past.13 Where an objectively verifiable account is the aim, historians commonly do far more work at verification. Where the views
of an outside discipline is the goal, historians by definition provide
the narratives, interpretations, or questions that are sought. Accordingly, perhaps the worst thing law scholars can do is plunge directly into primary sources with no idea of the relevant
historiographical accounts or frameworks. This is not to say that
professional historians should enjoy immunity from lawyerly questioning. It is to say that invoking reliance on their work in the first
instance offers a feasible, and, frankly, a not very demanding, way
of providing far more credible accounts than the legal community
usually produces today.
With other unitarians, Calabresi and Yoo open the historical
door wide and thus invite 1-istorical critique. Through his earlier
scholarship, Calabresi defends the originalist tradition forged by
Chief Justice Taft54 and Justice Scalia,55 against such recent
historicist challenges set forth by Professors Abner Greene,56 Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein. 7 With their present study,
Calabresi and Yoo also invoke custom for historical support in the
manner of Frankfurter in particular.58 Substantively, these approaches combine to present a historical fall from grace that is
downright Borkian: the Founders originally granted the President
exclusive removal authority; Presidents have customarily defended

52. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at vii-viii (1969); FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 67 n.25 (1985).
53. See, e.g. Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite," in Modern American Constitutionalism,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 523, 549-556 (1995).
54. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 94 (1926).
55. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 361 (1989).
56. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 123 (1994).
57. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1994).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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this prerogative; Congress and the Courts, however, have joined
forces to usurp the original understanding and executive tradition. 9 In each regard, historical standards rightly come into play.
Il. CONSTITUTIONAL CUSTOM

A. Rendering Unto Clio
To take the project in reverse order, these standards suggest
that Calabresi and Yoo have produced an account of constitutional
custom that is plausible-indeed highly probable-but as yet unproven. As Professor Theodore Lowi observed, their project reads
like one of the most thoroughly researched briefs that anyone interested in this or any other topic could possibly desire.' Like a
brief, however, the account also raises certain concerns about how
open it is to possible points on the other side. Nonetheless, any
historical assessment, good or bad, must be provisional in light of
the same historical precepts that would form the basis of that assessment. No adequate critique can be offered that does not itself
rest upon the degree of basic rigor that the initial account should
ideally reflect to begin with."' Any critique, in other words, must
practice the standards that it preaches, and that would require more
time, space, and expertise than an immediate response of this sort
allows.
Nonetheless, some points seem clear. Without doubt, The
Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century makes an important contribution to our understanding of how "things have worked
out." This contribution rests most squarely on the extensive primary research that Professor Lowi wrongly dismisses as "overkill."'62
Demonstrating extended and consistent presidential defense of perceived executive authority requires extended and consistent reliance
on actions that Presidents actually took and statements that they
actually uttered. Calabresi and Yoo deliver these goods throughout
their paper. Especially rich in this regard is the authors' treatment
of Andrew Jackson, the President who fought for executive authori-

59. Cf.BORK, supra note 47, at 19-99.
60. See Remarks of Theodore J.Lowi, Symposium on Presidential Power in the Twenty-First Century, Case Western Reserve University Law School (April 8, 1997).
61. For a critique that attempts to live up to standards it professes, see Flaherty, supra
note 16, at 1756-1810.
62. Remarks of Theodore J. Lowi, Symposium on Presidential Power in the TwentyFirst Century, Case Western Reserve Law School (April 8, 1997).
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ty more vigorously and eloquently than any other in the Republic's
first half-century.63 The historical case that results is accordingly
convincing.
Calabresi and Yoo are convincing not just because of how
they present their case, but also because of what their case
holds.' That is, the account of presidential vigilance that they
present is-to put it mildly-intuitive in light of certain background propositions about human nature and the growth of presidential power. As Madison famously observed, "[T]hose who administer each department" will not infrequently act out of ambition
and self-interest. This is not to say that history does not often
belie what appear to be common sense truths. Historians revel in
confirming counterintuitive stories when preliminary evidence suggests something unusual took place.' Presidential vigilance, however, does not appear to be one of these. More importantly, the account comports with standard historical accounts. In particular,
historians from Ralph Ketcham67 to Forrest McDonald 68 have all
sounded the common theme of the growth of presidential power.
Set in an evolving tradition of executive aggrandizement, Presidential defense of removal authority would appear to follow.
An important contribution, however, should not be confused
with a dispositive one. And here the project's brief-like singlemindedness gives one pause. This quality would be acceptable,
perhaps mandatory, were the authors in the Office of Legal Counsel actually writing a brief. But here they are scholars engaged in a
good faith effort to examine whether or not a form of external
authority-here constitutional custom-bolsters a position that they
have otherwise adopted for textual and normative reasons. Nor
would it suffice to say that the historical account need only be

63. See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 15, at 1458-59, 1526-59.
64. Elsewhere I distinguished "procedural" historical standards, which refers to method,
and "substantive" standards, which refer to how well a proffered account comports with
an established historiographical narrative or framework, if either is available. See Flaherty,
supra note 53, at 549-56.
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1962).
66. Edmund Morgan, for example, wrote a celebrated account seeking to explain why
the early settlers of Jamestown starved rather than raise crops, hunt, or otherwise provide
for themselves in a land of evident plenty. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 73-91 (1975).
67. See RALPH KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789-1829 (1984).
68. See FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1994).

19971

REMOVAL POWER & JOINTACCOUNTABILITY

1577

good enough to be convincing to a legal audience. As noted, appeals to history convince such an audience because the appeal is to
a source of authority outside of the law.69
One set of concerns about the project's zeal sounds in method.
It has, for example, proceeded with considerable swiftness given its
heroic scope of no less than thirty-two presidencies. This may
seem an odd criticism considering that the overall undertaking has
already taken over three years and runs beyond 300 pages. Historical studies, however, typically take as long or longer for considerably narrower topics. Given its breadth, moreover, even just the
present portion of the undertaking often seems too certain, simple,
and unqualified.
The Washington administration provides a case in point, While
they refer to Washington's role in putting down the Whiskey Rebellion, for example, Calabresi and Yoo fail to report that the
President did not federalize the Pennsylvania militia until he first
received a determination from Associate Justice James Wilson that
civil authority in the state had broken down, a requirement set
forth in the Militia Act of 1792.70 Rather than mention this dramatic, and apparently unresisted, encroachment on presidential
authority, Calabresi and Yoo instead devote an extended treatment
to the well known defense of executive authority penned by Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton, among his generation's most extreme advocates on the point.
Another set of caveats goes to substance in the sense of considering whether the authors' views broadly comport with interpretations, narratives, and frameworks established by historians who
have often spent lifetimes studying the presidency or given Presidents. Of concern in this regard is the authors' idiosyncratic reliance on historians. Some of the most eminent historians of the
early national period are simply absent or barely mentioned, even
when they have produced studies that are directly on point. This
roster includes such well-known scholars as McDonald, Ketcham,
Stanley Elkins, David McKittrick, Dumas Malone, and Irving
Brant. By contrast, the present portion of the study displays a
comparatively greater willingness to rely on works that are comparatively dated, that appeared in law reviews, or that were written by

69. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
ELKINS & DAVID McKITTRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 478
(1993).
70. See STANLEY
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jurists or politicians who are known more as advocates of presidential power than as dispassionate scholars. Use of the secondary
literature may seem superfluous when, as here, use of the primary
sources is so extensive. Nearly the opposite is true. Without a
basic grounding in the relevant historiography, placing particular
executive pronouncements in context becomes difficult and often
impossible. And without sufficient context, interpretations of what
people said long ago can often miss what they meant at the time,
however obvious their meanings may seem to us today.
All told, these and other possible cautionary notes are likely to
prove to be little more than quibbles. At this stage, however, sufficient methodological concerns about the initial account make at
least one point clear. More work, and much more scholarly assessment of that work, will have to be done before the current, bold
version of Calabresi and Yoo's thesis can pass historical muster as
the final word on the topic. It is, however, an extremely persuasive
first word.
B. Rendering Unto Ccesar
What questions The Unitary Executive does raise have less to
do with history than with law. Many if not most lawyerly appeals
to the past make grand normative claims based upon a minimum
of historical homework. Calabresi and Yoo invert this standard
picture. They laudably do a good deal of research. The constitutional payoff, however, appears minimal. In fairness, Calabresi and
Yoo do not pretend to develop a full-blown theory about the legal
significance of presidential custom. Still less is a response such as
this the place for an extended theoretical critique. A few observations seem appropriate nonetheless.
For starters, the authors seem bent on refuting an erroneous
school of thought without first having established that it exists. The
central aim of not just this article, but the three to follow, is to
"examine the claim . . . that the custom, tradition, and practice of
the last 208 years amounts to a presidential acquiescence in the
existence of congressional power to (at times) limit the President's
removal power and curtail his other constitutionally granted mechanisms of control over law execution." 7' This is a useful undertaking, but it is unclear that anyone has argued for such a tradition.
Given Madisonian intuitions about ambition, it is even less clear

71. Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 15, at 1457.
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why anyone would. Calabresi and Yoo do offer four scholars as
"jumping to the conclusion" that such a tradition of acquiescence
has occurred. On closer examination, three of these examples turn
out to be passing references to presidential ambivalence about
modem independent agencies.72 The other conclusory leap is in
reality the authors' misreading of my own position.73
More importantly, Calabresi and Yoo's research supports a
claim that, for now, is almost entirely defensive. To their credit,
the authors are careful to point out that their recovery of presidential custom establishes only that Congress has failed to adversely
possess authority ostensibly vested in the President, rather than the
other way around. They are also careful to point out that if the
other branches should ever bow to presidential custom-itself a
bolder claim-the most compelling case is itself defensive. Drawing upon ideas of departmental or coordinate review, they tentatively argue that "it would seem that deference to the President's consistent and vigorous interpretation of the scope of the removal
power is appropriate."74
Nonetheless, just because claims are defensive does not mean
they do not run into problems. Calabresi and Yoo, first of all, need
to work out a more complete theory of acquiescence. Why, for
example, should a President's failure to oppose an unfriendly bill
count as acquiescence-failures that Calabresi and Yoo demonstrate
are rare-but not a failure to challenge the same measure, once
enacted, before the judiciary-failures which appear to have occurred almost all the time? The authors also need to defend more
thoroughly their conception of defensive resistance. From the White
House, asserting control over removal authority may look like
protecting executive prerogative. From Capitol Hill it may look far
more like employing legislative authority to structure offices, at
least when all that Congress asserts is the power to impose "for
cause" limits on removal power that the President otherwise retains.
But even when fully worked out, defensive claims do not
settle much. Grant for the moment that Presidents have done nothing to give away certain disputed powers to Congress. If, however,
Congress itself has consistently fought for the same powers, it too
has failed to cede anything. In this type of situation, constitutional

72. See id. at 1456 n.20.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 23-32.
74. Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 15, at 1469.
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custom may well show that the branches have been jealous of their
perceived powers much as Madison expected, but it does not determine which branch's claim is valid. As Justice Frankfurter himself
suggested, it is only when both the President and Congress acquiesce on the allocation of a particular power that the matter can be
regarded as presumptively settled.75 Yet the historical account that
Calabresi and Yoo put forward necessarily suggests consistent
congressional opposition, if only because without it, consistent
presidential "defense" would be unnecessary.76 Further, this same
account tends to expose additional problems with bolder potential
assertions of coordinate review. When both the President and Congress claim the same authority, uncompromising rejection of the
other's position on constitutional grounds seems more a recipe for
chaos than working government. Perhaps for this reason, Calabresi
and Yoo prudently stop short of asserting outright that merely
because Presidents have exercised certain powers they have rightly
exercised them.
IV. BACK To THE FOUNDING

A. Framing Joint Accountability
In contrast to their work on constitutional custom, Calabresi
and Yoo's assumptions about original intent reflect grand constitutional claims based upon historical evidence that is more wishful
thinking than fact. As noted, this originalist element is the more
important part of Professor Calabresi's overall case because it
serves as the theoretical predicate for the custom argument, 7 To
argue that the Presidents have not given away a power assumes
that they rightfully wielded this power in the first place. Should
history belie that the Founders' understood the Executive to enjoy
sole, at-will removal authority, then Presidential defense of the
power starts to look less like high-minded preservation. Here some
preliminary work has been done.78 Unfortunately for the unitarian

75. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
76. Exactly this story of ongoing interbranch conflict supports my prior conclusion,
however much it was made in passing, that 200 years of constitutional practice does not
settle matters in favor of the unitary executive. See Flaherty, supra note 16, at 1816.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 10-16, 24-27, 33-36.
78. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 16; Greene, supra note 56.
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position, it indicates that the originalist predicate is based more on
wishful thinking than credible history.
Pragmatic fidelity to the Founding first requires a look at the
substantial, and in many ways unprecedented, body of ideological,
legal, and constitutional history produced in the last generation.
The scholarly roster includes, among others, Bernard Bailyn, Barbara Black, Forrest McDonald, Edmund Morgan, J.G.A. Pocock, John
Phillip Reid, and Gordon Wood. Despite important differences, the
work of these scholars taken together enables a coherent reconstruction of constitutional development in the late eighteenth century.79 Only with the general context that results from this reconstruction can more specific primary sources be marshalled for more
particular questions. Even then, an adequate account would have a
far greater reach both in terms of scope and length." For present
purposes-here a focus on accountability and removal authority-the following outline must suffice. That outline begins with
independence.
Independence ushered in a set of often radically republican
state constitutions, which in turn meant a commitment to a straightforward conception of governmental accountability. All this was
truly revolutionary, not least because it reflected a rejection of
English "mixed" government to which Americans had previously
hailed. Under the theory of mixed government, the English Constitution provided for three institutions (King, Lords, and Commons)
that embody three types of government (monarchy, aristocracy,
democracy) that in turn track three orders (monarch, nobility, commoners) evident in any society. Replicating the English Constitution
in a newly independent United States proved to be a non-starter in
part because no monarch or nobility in the European sense existed
on American soil. It was a non-starter as well since by 1776
Americans identified Parliament's unrepresentativeness with attacks
on rights. In this light, the main option for American
constitutionalists became a republican model in which self-government and actual representation became as thoroughgoing as anything the world had seen.
The early state constitutions implemented these ideas by creating powerful legislatures that were designed to represent the people
as closely as possible. In what Professor Wood calls "a revolution-

79. See generally, Flaherty, supra note 53, at 536-49.
80. For an attempt at such an account, see Flaherty, supra note 16.
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ary transformation of political authority," these first-generation
frameworks concentrated nearly all significant power in the assembly, the lower house in particular.8' Most early state legislatures
could, for example, not only pass laws, but could in many cases
appoint judges and governors, proceed without threat of executive
veto or adjournment, alter judicial and magisterial salaries, and
effectively amend their constitutions by statute. 2 Pennsylvania's
Constitution of 1776, the most radical of the early experiments,
concentrated legislative power still further by abolishing the upper
house of the legislature and effectively doing the same with the
governor.83 Moreover, notes Morgan, where "the colonists had
been contending that a representative ought to think, feel, and act
like his constituents . . .[n]ow they began to practice what they
preached."84 Annual elections, terms limits, a right of localities to
"instruct" their representatives, and an extensive franchise for its
day all quickly became common features throughout the several
states.85 In typical fashion, Pennsylvania further provided that the
doors of the assembly remain open and that all bills be printed for
public consideration. 6 In many regards, never before and never
again would American government be more straightforwardly accountable.
By contrast, the Constitution of the United States reflected
what Wood terms a new "Federalist science of politics," a science
that entailed a far more diffident stance toward accountability. As
before, this response resulted largely from "the lessons of experience,"" in this instance the perceived failures of the republican
state constitutions. Foremost
among these was the discovery of
"democratic despotism,"88 the realization that the people could

81. See GORDON S.
(1969).
82. See, e.g., DEL.
CONST. of 1776, paras.
83. See PA. CONST.

WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 163
CONST. of 1776, arts. 7, 10; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20; VA.
8-10; see also WOOD, supra note 81, at 141.
of 1776, §§ 2.

84. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGN-

247-48 (1988).
85. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 3, 15; GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. II, III,
XXIII, XVI, XXIII, LIII; MD. CONST. of 1776, arts. XXV, XXVI, XXVII; N.C. CONST.
of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. 18; PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 8, 9, 11, 31; VT. CONST.
of 1777, ch. II, §§ VIII, X; VA. CONST. of 1776, paras. 4. 5. 6.
86. See PA. CONST. of 1776, §§ 13 & 15.
87. FORREsT MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 143-83 (1985).
88. WOOD, supra note 81, at 404.
TY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
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tyrannize themselves. 9 On this view, selfish factions and demagogic leaders had seized too many state legislatures, and these in
turn had enacted ill-advised laws infringing rights of contract,
property, and trial by jury.
A principal solution to democratic despotism came in the form
of what had been to that point largely a secondary doctrine most
commonly associated with Montesquieu known as separation of
powers. Where mixed government linked governmental institutions
with different social classes, the newly fashionable theory connected them to different government powers. In now familiar fashion,
the strategy solved the problem of concentrated authority by allocating legislative power (defined roughly as the promulgation of
general norms) to the assemblies; executive power (viewed generally as implementing those norms) to a magistrate; and adjudicative
power (seen basically as the resolution of legal disputes) to judges.
Yet the newfound distrust of unitary popular mandates led to the
corollary that each branch of government should have some direct
or indirect democratic basis.
The Federal Constitution, following several "second-generation" state frameworks, put these principles into effect with a general blueprint that was clearly filled in only at the top. The document greatly enhanced the power of a distinct executive and judiciary. Among other things, it created a unitary presidency (as opposed to executive branch), granted the President a qualified veto,
salary protection, protection from removal except by impeachment
and set out what was then a unique set of express powers. Likewise, the judiciary benefitted from life tenure, its own salary protection, and newly established and widely contemplated power of
judicial review.
The Constitution, however, did more than simply shift authority from the legislature. It also made each branch accountable to the
people while at the same time denying to any branch the dangerous claim of speaking for the people exclusively. Most obviously,
the Federal Chief Magistrate would not be a mere appointee of the
legislature, as were many of his state counterparts, but would be
indirectly elected by the people. Congress, of course, would remain
democratically accountable as well. In contrast to the Pennsylvania
assembly, however, the national legislature would also be bicameral
with the directly elected House and the then-indirectly elected
89. Id. at 403-13; McDONALD, supra note 87, at 143-83.
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Senate, thus multiplying the democratic bases still further. Even the
unelected judiciary furthered the strategy. While state practice
mainly left judicial selection to the legislature, the Constitution
accorded it to both the President and Senate, thus making the least
dangerous branch ultimately answerable to two electorates rather
than one.
Conspicuous by its absence in these developments is evidence
of any widespread agreement on removal power. One telling example highlighted by Justice Scalia must suffice (even though it deals
with the related topic of appointment authority). As the Justice
noted, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 illustrates contemporary ideas about government with an express and seemingly absolute separation of powers clause.' The Justice might also have
noted that the Massachusetts framework is doubly probative since it
was precisely the type of "second generation" state constitution that
anticipated the Federal Constitution." A glance at the rest of the
Massachusetts document, however, reveals that many of the most
important executive posts-including the state secretary, treasurer,
and militia officers-not only could but had to be appointed by the
Assembly.92 It may be of course, that these assignments were
merely exceptions to an established background understanding of
formal separation. The problem with that theory is that all sorts of
exceptions, variations, and experiments characterized not only contemporary state frameworks, but the Federal plan as well.93 Perhaps more important, both the pace of constitutional development
during this era,94 combined with the relatively novel appearance of
Montesquieu as applied rather than theoretical doctrine,95 makes
the notion untenable.

90. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-98 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The clause
reads:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XXX.
91. See WOOD, supra note 81, at 451-53; CHARLES C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE
PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 'mORY 51-52 (1969).
92. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. R, ch. II, § 4, art. I; see also N.H. CONST. of
1784, pt. I, art. XXXVII & pt. II.
93. See Flaherty, supra note 16, at 1768-71, 1776, 1778-87.
94. Id. at 1774-75.
95. See WOOD, supra note 81, at 153-54.
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What the Founding generation generally agreed upon were the
more general underlying functions that separation of powers ideally
furthered. The clearest theme involved balance among the three
principal branches of government. Reformers, Federalists, and
Antifederalists alike championed separation of powers as a means
to prevent the tyrannical accretion of power in any one part of
government, however much they disagreed on the doctrine's specifics. To a lesser extent, the Founders also advocated separation of
powers in the name of greater governmental energy. More interesting, and counterintuitive, are Founding attitudes about the
doctrine's relationship to governmental accountability. In contrast to
modern unitarian views, the Founding generation did not exclusively, or even primarily, view separation of powers as means to making those who implement the law exclusively accountable to a
Chief Magistrate, who was in turn accountable to the people. Rather, their own experience of government led the Founders to
reconceptualize earlier notions about accountability to make the
concept less dangerous and more representative of a deliberative
electorate as a whole.
The reconceptualization grew out of a zeal for accountability
that soon evolved into caution. Initially American constitutionalists
viewed governmental responsiveness as an undivided good. Early
state constitutions therefore concentrated power in the legislature as
the most representative branch in part to make the line of governmental responsibility transparent. These initial charters further employed such devices as annual elections and rotation in office to
ensure representatives were more responsive. The discovery of
"democratic despotism," however, led many to rethink matters. The
actual experience under the early frameworks suggested that the
simple view of accountability led to governments that were not
really accountable at all, but which instead fell prey to factions,
demagogues and localism. Separation of powers helped deal with
this problem by recasting accountability in ways that made it less
dangerous and more deliberative.
This newer conception of "joint accountability," to give it a
modern name, viewed precipitous governmental action in the name
of popular mandates with suspicion, and so sought to ensure that
each significant segment of government could plausibly claim some
popular basis in its own right. In this way, no single branch of
government could wield power in the name of the people without
some agreement from other branches armed with similar claims.

1586

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1563

Later constitutions implemented this idea of joint accountability
mainly by taking selection of the governor out of the hands of the
legislature and placing it into the hands of the electorate, while at
the same time involving both the assembly and chief magistrate in
the appointment of the judiciary.
The Federal Constitution sounded a variation on this theme
through indirect popular election of the president and presidential
selection of federal judges with the advice and consent of the (then
also indirectly elected) Senate. Defending this scheme, James Wilson observed that "[t]he executive and judicial are now drawn from
the same source ..
with the legislative authority: they who execute, and they who administer the laws, are so much the servants,
and therefore as much friends of the people, as those who make
them."' Professor Wood sums up the significance of such claims
in terms of accountability, noting: "Because the Federalists regarded the people as 'the only legitimate fountain of power,' no department was theoretically more popular and hence more authoritative
than any other."' No one department, in other words, would
again be able to claim an exclusive popular mandate to undertake
oppressive measures, as state assemblies had done before.
This is not to say that modem unitarians can take no solace
from the Founding. The older concept of accountability, for example, did not vanish. Hamilton, perhaps his generation's foremost
champion of a strong executive, famously linked the older view to
presidential power in defending the Convention's choice to create a
responsive, unitary president as opposed to the type of executive
committee that some states had previously attempted (yet also as
opposed to a unitary executive branch, as modem unitarians often
misconstrue the point).9" As Professor Lowi observes, it is all but
axiomatic that a complex governmental framework such as the
Constitution would reflect several different notions of accountability
at once.99 But it should also be clear that a concept's failure to
disappear does not mean it continued to dominate. To the contrary,
the development of constitutional thought during the Founding
period demonstrates that simpler notions of accountability survived

96. Id. at 598 (quoting James Wilson).

97. Id. at 550 (citation omitted).
98. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.
1961).
99. Remarks of Theodore J. Lowi, Symposium on Presidential Power in the TwentyFirst Century, Case Western Reserve Law School (April 4-5, 1997).
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despite the emergence of separation of powers. rather than because
of it.
Likewise, to note that the Founding reveals no consensus
about exclusive presidential removal authority is not to insist that
the Founders believed that the President need not be involved in
removal at all, at least as an initial matter. As the foregoing account sought to make clear, certain functional values underlying
separation of powers-such as joint accountability-commanded the
most evident and widespread assent at the time. Yet also prompting
general agreement was at least the core formalist notion that the
legislature should enact binding norms, the executive should implement them, and the judiciary should resolve disputes that arise
under them. Wilson reflected this fundamental notion in speaking
of departments that "make," "execute," and "administer" (by which
he meant adjudicate) the law."°° This basic division at least suggests an expectation that the head of the executive department
would normally play a role in removal of underlings who help see
to it that the laws are executed. Hamilton assumed as much in his
oft-noted argument that Senate approval would be necessary both
for certain appointments and dismissals because what that body
would affirm in the first place would be prior presidential actions. "' On this view the Supreme Court's holding in Bowsher v.
Synar" gains additional plausibility since Congress in that case
had denied the President any role in removing the Comptroller
General when that official was arguably executing the laws.
Even here, however, a thorough account of the period counsels
prudence. Though the Founding generation commonly employed the
terms "legislate," "execute," and "adjudicate," they rarely paused to
define even the central meaning of these ideas with precision. Still
less did the Founders clearly address, much less resolve, such
ancillary mechanisms as removal, issues that have been the fodder
of interbranch battles from then until now. The general goals of
the doctrine are clear and with effort can be reconstructed. More
detailed assumptions, especially when unsupported by similarly
detailed constitutional text, cannot.

100. See supra text accompanying note 98.
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1962).
102. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).

1588

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 47:1563

B. Executing Joint Accountability
As a source of constitutional norms, the Founding thus takes
away but also gives in return. Properly reconstructed, the Founders'
ideas about separation of powers deprive unitarians of their
originalist predicate and with it precise baseline assumptions about
such contested subjects as removal. Founding ideas nonetheless do
furnish clear yet more abstract commitments. These general precepts, however, subvert the unitarian position in light of changed
circumstances and subsequent constitutional developments. In this
different light, constitutional custom does not confirm an original
unitary understanding that in fact never existed. Instead, subsequent
practice undermines the unitarian position once more general
Founding values are applied to modem government.
Seeking fidelity to the Founders' more general concepts fully
comports with what self-proclaimed originalists preach, though not
always with what they practice. Justice Scalia, for example, almost
always finds original commands in precise understandings or contemporaneous applications. This tendency is especially egregious in
the Justice's separation of powers pronouncements, where he fails
even to acknowledge the considerable historical evidence that renders his formalist position problematic at best."°3 These results
have led some commentators to label such uniform applications as
"narrow" or "hard" originalism.' ° History's notorious messiness,
however, suggests that precision will often be a mirage.' That,
at any rate, is clearly the case with separation of powers. An
originalist's only alternative, therefore, is to become more "broad"
and attempt to maintain faithfulness to the more abstract norms
that may emerge. No less a figure than Judge Bork concurs, observing: "[A] judge should state a principle at the level of generality that text and historical evidence warrant."'"

103. Printz v. United States, 1997 U.S. LExiS 4044, *42 (opinion of Scalia, J.). By
contrast, Justice Scalia has been somewhat more candid about conceding historical evidence that conflicts with his doctrinal judgments in other areas. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29, 34-35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
104. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1,50 & n.
291 (1995).
105. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 857 (1995).
106. BORK, supra note 47, at 144.
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Identifying the initial norms, however, is only the first step.
Where an original meaning is sufficiently general to survive outside
its immediate context, the critical next step entails holding that
meaning constant in light of subsequent developments. Doing so
can proceed in at least two ways. One, articulated by Professor
Lessig, conceives the task as "translation." On this view specific
applications of a general principle may have to change in response
to changed context."° Another, developed by Professor Bruce
Ackerman, emphasizes "synthesis." This method posits the introduction of later constitutional norms that do not fully repeal, but
instead must be reconciled with, older norms.' Despite these differences, it does not especially matter which of these models are
followed in maintaining fidelity to Founding separation of powers
values. In applying a concept such as joint accountability, what
matters is the world that 200 years has created rather than whether
that world results from incremental change, as Lessig emphasizes,
or dramatic transformations, as Ackerman posits.
The changed circumstance most relevant to a principal of joint
accountability is obvious, sweeping, and entirely consistent with the
idea that presidents have spent the last two centuries in vigorous
pursuit of power. Where, during the Founding, most observers
viewed the legislature as the branch most likely to abuse popular
mandates, today that threat most clearly issues from the executive
thanks to what Professor Lowi has termed the rise of the
"plebicistary presidency."'" Recounting this phenomenon would
be more tedious than contentious. Historians generally agree that
the Founders expected the presidency to be mostly a nonpolitical
recognition for seniority and previous service to the nation."0
This conception broke down almost immediately, starting with
Jefferson's innovative efforts at partisan, issue-oriented, egalitarian
presidential leadership."' Andrew Jackson, and his brilliant theorist, Martin Van Buren, greatly extended Jefferson's achievements,
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and left behind them a full-blown model of the President as party
leader, proponent of the Federal agenda, and national personality.
Though this model did not always dominate in the 1800s, " 2
such factors as the growth of the national government, foreign
policy commitments, and the rise of the media have made it the
norm for this century. Perhaps no President more fully exploited its
potential than Franklin Roosevelt. Indeed it was precisely because
F.D.R. viewed himself as "the chosen leader of the American people" that he took the decision in Humphrey's Executor as almost a
personal affront and may well have prompted his direct assault on
separation of powers through the court-packing plan."' While the
populist presidency may have receded from these heights, it has
hardly disappeared. It is in fact just these current aspects of the
presidency that modem unitarians applaud." 4
At this point the path to a genuine constitutional fidelity becomes clear. For better or worse, the Founding does not yield a
specific understanding about removal power. It does, however,
display a more general commitment to, among other ideas, a notion
of joint accountability that aimed to prevent any one part of government from taking ill-considered or oppressive measures in the
name of last year's election results. Since then, the rise of the
populist presidency has meant that the most likely source for the
abuse of electoral mandates comes from the executive rather than
the legislature. It follows that congressional involvement in the
removal of officials who implement laws does not frustrate a key
Founding value, but furthers it."'
To see the argument at work, revisit the case that angered
F.D.R. Humphrey's Executor arose out of the President's desire to
"restaff and reinvigorate""' 6 the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") along New Deal lines, a doubly important task since the
FTC had recently been given key roles in administering both the
National Industrial Recovery Act and the Securities Act of 1933.
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Standing in F.D.R.'s way was then still very much alive
Humphrey, a Coolidge appointee whom Senator George Norris
once described as "the greatest reactionary of the country.""' 7 To
the President, who came up with the idea," 8 firing Humphrey
could not have been a more straightforward case of government
responsiveness to popular will. While F.D.R. may have had "a
vivid sense of presidential prerogatives,""' 9 he had after all been
swept into office by one of the greatest electoral landslides in
history.
From a joint accountability standpoint, however, Roosevelt was
only partly right. The House, the Senate, and in indirect ways,
even the Supreme Court, also had claims to popular mandates.
These bodies therefore had corresponding claims upon the FTC's
New Deal role, at least on a theory that government should not act
without thoroughly and deliberately reflecting the will of the electorate as a whole. Of course it happened that the House and Senate
agreed with what emerged as F.D.R.'s New Deal vision, themselves the result of electoral landslides repudiating the G.O.P. policies that Humphrey personified. The mere likelihood of congressional approval, however, does not mean that the President may unilaterally transform a key agency by removing a holdover member
for political reasons, especially when an earlier Congress had
sought to prevent just such an action. Instead, a theory of joint
accountability would dictate that the President seek actual congressional approval, either though the repeal of removal limits as they
applied to holdovers or more generally. This approval could almost
certainly have been gained precisely because the nation in 1933
had come close to speaking with one voice not just through the
presidential election, but through dozens of congressional elections
as well.
The point emerges more clearly when run through a slightly
different set of facts. Suppose, as happened, that F.D.R. had come
to office on the strength of a landslide. But further suppose, as did
not occur, that the Hoover Republicans retained both the House
and Senate. Taken in isolation the presidential returns would indeed
have signalled that the American people were committed to a New
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Deal, and with it a potential assault on current property and contract rights through powerful unelected agencies. The congressional
returns, however, would indicate nothing of the sort. The
Republic's clear message, in short, would be no clear message. On
these facts, presidential transformation of the FTC would appear
especially anomalous. Five New Dealers on the board might reflect
the agenda of the majority that voted for the President. A mixed
board, however, would have been more genuinely accountable to
the electorate as a whole.
A similar analysis holds for cases like Morrison. Recall that
the case specifically dealt with President Reagan's attempt to discharge a competent Independent Counsel who had undertaken an
investigation into the withholding of documents related to the enforcement of the "Superfund Law."' 0 Viewed more broadly, however, the controversy implicated questions of accountability no less
than Humphrey's Executor.
On one side of the issue, President Reagan had won his own
landslides based in no small part on a "get government off our
back" pledge to substantial deregulation. Consistent with this goal
was adopting a less aggressive stance toward ferreting out wrongdoing that may have resulted from too cozy a relationship between
government (de)regulators and business. Assuming the President's
mandate reflected a clear choice for the deregulatory approach,
getting rid of a watchdog like Morrison would also have been
consistent with-and a demonstrated accountability to-a shift in
the national mood.'
But such an assumption would have been incorrect. On the
other side of the question, the ever regulatory Democrats had retained the House even in their electoral debacle of 1980, and won
back the Senate two years later. Taking all of these Federal elections into account, the nation had in reality sent a mixed message
on deregulation and much else. In this more complete light, bold
experiments in slashing red tape were appropriate insofar as they
did track a significant shift in the national mood. Yet likewise
appropriate was insuring that a qualified prosecutor could police
those experiments lest they wind up cutting certain legal comers
along with red tape. From the perspective of joint accountability, a
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greater, more sustained mandate would not only have enabled, but
justified President Reagan in putting the brakes on investigators not
as committed to deregulation as he by modifying the Ethics in
Government Act through a compliant Congress. Such a thoroughgoing mandate, however, did not occur.
CONCLUSION: PLUS QA CHANGE

One irony in all of this is that much of the foregoing debate
may well be beside the point. As Professor Jonathan Entin points
out, Congress and the President have relied far more heavily on
devices other than removal in their perennial conflict over how to
influence the thousands of people who actually implement law and
policy." This is not to say, nor does Professor Entin, that the
removal power is unimportant. Even so, the parallel academic
battle over the issue, which the present exchange extends, may
have less to do with actual power and more to do with constitutional symbolism than either side would care to acknowledge.
If so, the current scholarly dispute still matters profoundly on
another plane. Lately the legal community has turned to history to
affect law, but this process necessarily impacts our understanding
of history. Professor Christopher Eisgruber rightly observes that the
Supreme Court is effectively a national educative institution that
has an impact apart form the controversies it resolves or the doctrine it settles."23 While Professor Eisgruber had lessons about justice in mind, in case after case the Court also proffers lessons
about our past. In its way, the legal academy performs much the
same role. The accounts of the past that result form an important
part of what Professor Frank Michelman describes as an
intergenerational dialogue that constitutes us not merely as a legal
order, but as a people. 24 These are high stakes. Basing this dialogue on wishful doctrinal thinking rather than credible historical
evidence has effects that range well beyond law reviews or U.S.
Reports.
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Credible historical evidence almost certainly demonstrates that
for 208 years Presidents have jealously guarded what they have
seen as their constitutional prerogatives. Calabresi and Yoo are to
be congratulated for undertaking the massive job of bringing this
evidence to light. Nonetheless, their narrative does not so much
confirm an original constitutional grant as it does demonstrate that
Presidents have acted out of institutional self-interest much as the
Founders expected. If the contribution that these two scholars make
confirms anything, it is that two centuries of practice under the
Constitution has not resolved the removal question with any more
finality than did the Founding generation. What history shows, as it
often does, is that the more things have changed, the more they
have stayed the same. Therefore, it follows that placing the removal question outside the reach of the political branches would be
more innovation than preservation. Such innovation may or may
not be a good idea on normative grounds. But as an innovation, it
looks to history at its own risk.

